





























































































































Little solid evidence exists on the practices of industrialized country banks operating
in emerging markets. Critics of the industrialized country banks argue that these agents are
unstable lenders who undermine local financial markets.  Supporters see the foreign banks as
key sources of otherwise scarce capital, with broader positive spillovers on the stability and
efficiency of local financial markets. Clearly, there is a need for careful analysis of the lending
practices of industrialized country banks to foreign clients. Our goal in this paper is to make
progress in this direction by examining the activities of individual U.S. banks with foreign
exposures. This micro-data approach facilitates a comparison of the lending behavior of these
banks in the complete set of countries in which the banks have positions. By working with
bank-level data, we can consider which types of U.S. banks (with size as a defining
characteristic) are the more volatile lenders, in which regions the lending by these banks is
most volatile, and whether lending to certain regions is volatile mainly because of higher
volatility of the economic fundamentals of these regions.
The main data we use are from quarterly foreign exposure data filed by each U.S. bank
(or bank holding company) and collected as a component of the bank supervisory process.
The Country Exposure Reports provide a by-country distribution of the foreign claims held by
individual U.S. banks,
1 revealing the extent of geographic (and to a lesser extent maturity and
type of) concentration of the bank’s international holdings.  We match this data with bank call
report information to have corresponding series on the quarterly assets of the same set of
banks. Taken together, these data enable us to discuss the international portfolio allocations of
individual U.S. banks and consider the evolution of U.S. bank claims abroad.
We pose a number of questions relevant for understanding the scope of U.S. bank
activity in international markets.  First, what are the characteristics of those U.S. banks that
are international players? We describe the number of reporting banks, the average size of
these banks, the scope of their international exposures, and the geographical diversification of
their portfolios. Second, what drives changes in U.S. bank claims on particular countries or
regions? We conduct an econometric analysis of the sensitivity of various international
positions to a set of key macroeconomic fundamentals. In the same way that Peek and
                                                          
1 The use of the term “U.S. banks” in this paper generally includes U.S. owned banks and U.S. subsidiaries of
foreign banks.3
Rosengren (1997, 2000) showed that Japanese banks transmit shocks from Japan to the United
States, we consider whether U.S. banks transmit U.S. business cycle fluctuations to their
foreign borrowers. We also posit that U.S. bank international exposures may be closely tied to
the performance of particular countries or regions. We examine these relationships,
throughout considering whether there are observable differences in these sensitivities across
U.S. banks differentiated by their size or across the industrialized or emerging market partners
of the U.S. banks.
Our main findings are the following:
•  Over the past two decades, the U.S. banks engaged in international lending have become
more diverse: there are now fewer banks overall, and these banks are more polarized in
terms of their size and portfolio allocations.
•  An increasing portion of reporting U.S. banks, particularly smaller banks, maintain an
exclusive focus on Latin American markets. The lending by smaller banks, especially with
respect to Latin American and Asian markets, has been more volatile than the lending by
larger banks.
•  Compared with smaller U.S. banks, larger banks maintain claims on a larger number of
countries.  About 60 percent of large bank exposure is in industrialized countries, with
most of the remaining exposure evenly split between the emerging markets of Latin
America and Asia.
•  Looking across U.S. banks, foreign claims are highly correlated with U.S. GDP growth,
but not with foreign demand conditions. The negative correlation between U.S. bank
claims and U.S. GDP growth for industrialized country partners suggests that net claims
on these areas contract when the U.S. economy is expanding. A similar result arises for
claims on emerging Asia. By contrast, the positive correlation observed for claims on
Latin American countries suggests that lending to Latin America expands as the U.S.
economy grows.
•  Foreign claims of U.S. banks are correlated with real U.S. interest rates, but generally
uncorrelated with foreign real interest rates.  Tighter real lending conditions in the United
States are associated with lower real claims on industrialized countries and higher claims
on Latin American countries.4
•  Overall, U.S. banks have not been volatile lenders internationally. Even in periods of
international financial crises, we do not observe statistically significant or extensive
retrenchments of U.S. bank international claims.
These findings have direct relevance for currency crisis prevention in emerging
markets. First, while U.S. banks are active participants in international markets, relatively few
of these banks have high shares of their assets located abroad. A large portion of U.S.
international claims remains within industrialized countries, but certain regions --- most
particularly Latin America --- are important lending destinations of U.S. banks. In recent
years, some small U.S. banks have heavily concentrated claims on Latin American countries
and high ratios of foreign claims to overall bank assets.
The sensitivity of foreign claims to the U.S. business cycle parallels the type of
observations that have been made by Peek and Rosengren, wherein Japanese banks were
conduits for transmission of Japanese shocks to U.S. markets. In our sample, these spillovers
are statistically significant for Latin America, but not consistently so for other emerging
market regions.
2 The positive correlation implies that lending to Latin American countries
rises when the United States grows faster, even after controlling for the local GDP growth.
Some of this expansion may be related to trade credit provision or investments in Latin
America’s exporting sectors.
Small countries often express the concern that the international lender --- conducting
lending activities directly through foreign-owned branches or indirectly through cross-border
exposures --- will make the emerging market economies more sensitive to external
fluctuations through the lending channels. While we concur that there is evidence of
international transmission of cycles, some of this correlation would likely be evident even in
the absence of a U.S. bank presence. More important is the observation that generally the U.S.
lenders are relatively stable providers of credit.  Especially important is the lack of correlation
between U.S. bank claims on emerging markets and the real demand cycles of those markets.
These findings reinforce the conclusions by Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000) that foreign
banks operating in emerging markets may play an important role in stabilizing overall
                                                          
2 In some specifications there is a significantly negative correlation between U.S. GDP growth and U.S. bank
claims on Asian emerging markets. Goldberg and Klein (1998) reached similar conclusions for foreign direct
investment patterns.5
lending. Since local banks are highly sensitive to local conditions, stable credit supplies by
external lenders may reduce the lending and investment instability in emerging market
economies in times of emerging market financial and balance of payments crises. As argued
by Palmer (2000), U.S. banks appear to take a long view of their positions in many
industrialized and emerging market regions, and local claims are relatively stable as a result.
The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. Section II discusses the data,
the U.S. banks that are lending abroad, and their international exposures. Section III
econometrically explores the volatility of the international claims of the U.S. banks. Section
IV provides concluding remarks related to currency crisis prevention and presents suggestions
for further analysis of this rich data source.
II.  Reporting Banks and Their International Exposures
The main data for our analysis are from Country Exposure Reports filed quarterly by
individual banks. The Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council (FFIEC) report
009
3 must be filed by every U.S. chartered insured commercial bank in the 50 States of the
United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and US territories and possessions, that
meets both of the following criteria:
a.  has at least one of the following: a branch in a foreign country; a majority-owned
subsidiary in a foreign country; an Edge for Agreement subsidiary; a branch in Puerto
Rico or in any U.S. territory or possession (except that a bank with its head office in
Puerto Rico or any U.S. territory or possession need not report if it meets only this
criterion); or an International Banking Facility (IBF); and
b.  has, on a fully consolidated bank basis, total outstanding claims on residents of foreign
countries exceeding $30 million in aggregate.
The reported data provide considerable detail on the U.S. bank claims on foreign
countries, with itemization by individual country. Bank claims are fairly broadly defined,
encompassing credit extended to foreign country banks, public entities, and other recipients
                                                          
3 The FFIEC is an umbrella organization that collects and warehouses data for the Federal Reserve, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.  Much of the information collected via
the FFIEC 009 is made public, aggregated over all reporting banks, via the Country Exposure Lending Survey6
including individuals and businesses. In addition to direct international flows, bank claims
also include revaluation gains on interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, commodity and other
off-balance sheet contracts.  The reporting institution is asked to break down the cross border
claims outstanding by type of borrower (banks, public sector entities, other) and by time
remaining to maturity (one year and under, 1 to 5 years, and over one year). In other quarterly
reports, banks also provide information on their total assets located both in the United States
and abroad.
There are 200 possible foreign “countries” in which a bank can report an exposure
each quarter. These include industrialized countries; countries within emerging Europe –
encompassing a number of small countries and countries that were formerly part of the Soviet
Union; 35 countries under the heading of Latin America; 40 under the heading of Asia/Pacific
and Middle East; and 54 countries within Africa. Each bank is required to provide detailed
information on exposure to a country only when that exposure exceeds 1 percent of the
reporting institutions total assets or 20 percent of its total capital, whichever is less.
For the time period spanned by our data, 1984 through 2000:Q2, the number of U.S.
reporting banks with foreign exposures changes dramatically (Table 1). In the second half of
the 1980s, there were on average 192 banks that reported foreign exposures.
4 Almost all
reporting banks maintained positions in Latin America and in (non-U.S.) Industrialized
countries. A smaller proportion of banks are involved in developing Asia, with banks less
frequently involved in Africa and developing Europe.
The average number of reporting banks declined sharply over the course of the 1990s,
down to 152 in the first half and to 90 in the latter half of the 1990s. Much of this reduction is
associated with the general tendency toward banking sector consolidation in the United States
over this period. Additionally, in the late 1990s some banks opted to report exposures
consolidated at a bank holding company level, further reducing the number of distinct
reporting institutions. The data also reveal large changes in the relative popularity of regions
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(FFIEC Statistical Release E.16).  Palmer (2000) provides a useful discussion of trends in the aggregated data,
with specific emphasis on emerging markets.
4 Our unbalance panel originally began with 317 banks. 35 banks had only one year or less of nonzero total
exposure data and were deleted from our data set. Those observations with zero total exposure at any date were
deleted from our sample.  There were some foreign banks in our sample whose asset information was not
representative of their entire conglomerate. Since this created an inconsistency between the scope of exposure
information and the scope of asset information, these banks, classified as Edge Acts Banks and New York State
Article 12 corporations, and two other banks with unusual situations were eliminated from the sample.7
among the reporting banks: over time a smaller share of reporting banks were present in each
region of the world.  For example, while 182 banks had positions in (non-U.S.) Industrialized
countries in the late 1980s, this number declined to 72 by the late 1990s.
5  The number of U.S.
banks active in Latin America declined to 78.




















Alongside the sharp decline in the number of banks over the past two decades, we
observe important changes over time in the size distribution of the reporting banks (Table 2).
Although the mean and median bank size basically doubled over the 1984 through mid 2000
period, the actual change in the size distribution of these banks was much greater. Sorting
banks by quartiles based on their total assets, the average bank in the lowest quartile became
considerably smaller, down from $15 million to $7.5 million in assets.  In the next quartile of
banks, the average size doubled since the mid-1980s, with the representative bank growing
from $46 million to $102 million. The size variation within these quartiles of banks also grew
considerably. The banks classified in the third and especially the fourth quartile more clearly
reflect the phenomenon of banking sector consolidation. The average fourth quartile reporting
                                                          
5 Throughout the paper, when we refer to Industrialized Countries this means Industrialized countries other than
the United States.  The list of countries is provided in Appendix Table 3.8
bank tripled in asset size, to more than $1 billion in assets by the late 1990s, with numerous
banks considerably larger.  From both Tables 1 and 2 we conclude that while the number of
reporting banks has declined, the remaining banks have become considerably more diverse.
Table 2 Size of Reporting Banks: Total Assets, in $US millions.



































Beyond differences in size, there are also huge differences across individual banks in
their foreign exposure, measured as the sum of cross-border exposure and local country
claims, reported relative to total bank assets (Tables 3A and 3B).
6 The first five rows of Table
3A provide the unweighted averages of foreign exposure shares across all bank observations
and within every period.  For all banks taken together (and unweighted by bank size) there has
been a tendency toward increasing shares of foreign exposure in average U.S. bank portfolios.
However, this result is driven by tendencies among the smaller banks actively participating in
international markets. These banks have increased their average foreign portfolio share from
2.8 to 5.4 percent of bank assets. By contrast, the larger banks maintain smaller foreign
portfolio shares (at approximately 1 percent of bank assets) with the overall shares slightly
declining over time. Even when portfolio shares of all banks are weighted by their respective
asset positions of banks at each date, the overall foreign portfolio share of U.S. banks has
declined over time, to under 1 percent of U.S. bank assets.
                                                          
6 Observations are included for every period in which a bank reports non-zero foreign exposure.9
Table 3A Foreign Portfolio Shares of Reporting Banks:
Means, and Standard Deviations





































(Using total asset weights)
1.2 1.1 0.8
The low foreign exposure shares in Table 3A make it tempting to conclude that
international exposures pose very low degrees of foreign risk to the reporting banks. This
conclusion is inappropriate. Risk analysis is more often conducted in relation to parent bank
capital or equity, and generally not relative to the bank’s overall asset position.
7 If a bank’s
capital is 10 percent of assets, a foreign portfolio share of 5 percent would suggest that the
ratio of foreign exposure to capital is 50 percent for that bank – suggesting that bank equity
can be substantially threatened by adverse external conditions, even if such threats are not
obvious from the portfolio share data.  Additionally, the low numbers of Table 3A are the
result of having many banks with low exposures – less than 1 percent of assets --  reported
together with a lesser (but still substantial) number of banks with much higher foreign
exposures.
Table 3B provides average exposures for only those banks that have foreign exposures
greater than 1 percent of assets, reducing our sample to only 15 percent of those observations
reported in Table 3A.  Observe that these banks can have quite large exposures, rising to 8.2
(5.7) as an unweighted (weighted) averages for the late 1990s. The tendency toward
                                                          
7 See Palmer (2000) and Bomfim and Nelson (1998) for related discussions of the appropriate measurement of
risk.10
increasing exposure over time for the average bank is especially due to the large increases in
foreign exposure shares by the smaller and medium sized banks in the sample.  This sample of
larger banks has maintained foreign portfolio shares on the order of 5 to 6 percent of assets for
the full period covered by our data.
Table 3B Foreign Portfolio Shares of Reporting Banks with Exposure >1%:
Means, and Standard Deviations





































(Using total asset weights)
5.9 6.0 5.7
The form of these exposures has changed over time in terms of regional concentration
and in terms of clientele (banks, public sector borrowers, or other private borrowers). The
diversification structure across location and clientele is important for ultimately interpreting
our analysis of lending volatility later in the paper. One hypothesis is that when U.S. bank
positions are highly dispersed regionally, their lending may be more insulated from region-
specific disturbances and less volatile, even to regions experiencing shocks.
8
Table 4 considers the share of all reporting banks, regardless of size, maintaining
claims exclusively in one foreign region.
9 Only 4 percent of all bank-observations correspond
to an exclusive position in industrialized countries.  In stark contrast, by the second half of the
                                                          
8 Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000) show that within Argentina and Mexico, loans by domestic privately-
owned banks are more volatile with respect to local conditions than are loans by foreign owned banks.
9 The regions used by the IMF are: Industrialized Countries; Developing Europe, Developing Western
Hemisphere (mainly Latin America), Developing Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.11
1990s more than 12 percent of banks had foreign exposures exclusively concentrated in
developing countries of the Western Hemisphere (i.e. Latin America). These Latin American
markets are the main foreign focus of some small, specialized banks operating out of the
United States.
Table 4:  Share of all reporting banks maintaining a position exclusively in one region
(as percent of all reporting banks)












1984-1989 9.1 3.0 0.0 5.8 0.1 0.0 0.1
1990-1995 13.6 4.9 0.0 6.7 0.8 0.4 0.5
1996-2000 21.5 4.0 0.0 12.7 2.8 0.5 1.7
Given that a bank maintains an exposure to a particular region, we also examined the
likelihood that the same bank is diversified to other regions. Claims on Latin American
countries are always likely to be part of a bank’s portfolio, regardless of other regions in
which a bank maintains positions (Appendix Table 1).  Moreover, if a bank has a position in
Latin America, with the rise in Latin America specialization we observe a parallel decline
over time in the likelihood of that bank also having positions in Industrialized economies,
Asia, and Africa. If any bank has a position in Industrialized countries, there is a greater than
80 percent probability that the bank will also have positions in Latin America and 60 percent
in Asia.
The recipients of U.S. bank’s foreign exposure also have evolved over time and across
regions (Table 5).  The last 16 years are characterized by a declining (but still substantial) role
of bank-to-bank lending, by a general decline in lending to public entities, and by the rise in
lending to a broader group of non-bank private clientele.12
Table 5  Recipient Shares in U.S. Bank Exposure, over time and by region
(as percent of Total Exposure by Bank)
Period Banks Public Other Private
1984-1989 47.6 29.1 19.3
1990-1995 46.6 21.4 26.6
1996-2000 44.2 15.0 34.7
By Region
Industrialized Countries 62.4 12.8 18.7
Developing Europe 36.1 52.1 10.2
Latin America 36.3 40.6 20.8
Asia 47.5 24.4 21.2
1984-1989
Africa 21.2 52.1 23.9
Middle East 45.6 29.3 22.9
Industrialized Countries 57.9 9.9 24.1
Developing Europe 30.7 41.3 25.9
Latin America 37.5 24.1 35.3
Asia 54.2 11.8 23.3
1990-1995
Africa 22.6 45.3 27.3
Middle East 39.5 40.4 18.1
Industrialized Countries 49.0 10.8 32.6
Developing Europe 37.0 28.7 30.6
Latin America 42.4 10.1 43.9
Asia 53.0 4.6 27.7
1996-2000
Africa 29.7 32.0 29.8
Middle East 43.3 35.1 18.9
Distinguishing across regions, we further observe that:
•  In Industrialized countries, the substantial shift away from bank-to-bank lending
matches the rise in the non-bank private lending. Public sector borrowers have
played relatively small roles, hovering at about 10 percent of the U.S. bank claims
on these regions.13
•  The importance of public sector borrowers declined substantially as a fraction of
activity in Latin American exposures. The decline was from about 40 percent of
individual bank claims in the mid/late 1980s to just above ten percent by the late
1990s. In absolute terms, there has been a huge increase in U.S. bank private
lending to Latin American companies, with a smaller decline in public borrowing.
•  For Developing Asia, while the role of public borrowers decreased since the late
1980s, the shift toward direct lending to non-bank private clients has not been as
pronounced as observed in other regions.
  Also of interest is the source of these claims, whether generated by cross-border
operations, or by lending by U.S. branch or subsidiary operations already located in foreign
markets (Table 6).  The ratio of cross-border claims to total bank claims is near 100 percent
for almost all regions and almost all banks in the lower three quartiles of banks.  Local
lending activities are prevalent mainly among the larger banks. Averaging over banks in the
4
th quartile (again, without weighting by bank size), the share of U.S. bank claims that are
generated by local lending is 16 percent for Industrialized countries, 24 percent for
Developing Asia, and 10 percent for Latin American countries.
As a final descriptive exercise before turning to the volatility of claims of Section III,
in Table 7 we show the average importance of particular regions to the foreign exposures of
the reporting banks.  First, U.S. banks hold very small portions of their foreign portfolios in
the regions of Developing Europe, Africa and the Middle East.  On average, each of these
regions is on the order of one to two percent of the foreign portfolio, regardless of the size of
the banks. Among the largest banks Developing Europe gained popularity (to 2.2 percent of
portfolios) in the second half of the 1990s.  Among the smallest banks, the Middle East is in
some cases a higher portion of bank portfolio (at 3 to 4 percent).14
Table 6     The Relative Importance of Cross-Border versus Local Lending,
by Region and by Quartile









All Reporting Banks 94.1 99.2 98.5 93.5 97.5 98.1
Quartile 1 99.9 99.9 100.0 99.7 100.0 100.0
Quartile 2 99.0 100.0 100.0 99.1 99.9 100.0
Quartile 3 95.9 100.0 99.0 97.5 99.5 100.0
Quartile 4 78.3 98.1 94.1 83.5 95.7 95.5
1990-1995
All Reporting Banks 91.9 98.0 97.0 89.3 95.2 98.0
Quartile 1 99.7 100.0 99.9 99.1 100.0 100.0
Quartile 2 98.1 100.0 99.8 97.8 99.7 100.0
Quartile 3 92.5 99.9 96.4 95.1 100.0 100.0
Quartile 4 74.8 96.3 90.1 74.6 92.2 95.2
1996-2000
All Reporting Banks 92.2 96.3 96.4 85.3 91.5 97.4
Quartile 1 100.0 100.0 99.8 96.7 100.0 100.0
Quartile 2 96.3 99.9 97.8 89.8 100.0 100.0
Quartile 3 91.6 98.8 96.6 91.5 100.0 100.0
Quartile 4 84.2 96.3 90.5 76.0 92.2 96.015
Table 7           Regional Total Exposure Shares, by Bank Type and Over Time








   All Banks 55.5 1.0 26.0 13.3 2.4 1.8
Quartile 1 51.5 0.9 37.5 5.5 1.7 3.1
Quartile 2 52.6 1.2 34.0 10.2 1.1 0.9
Quartile 3 53.5 0.9 29.4 12.7 1.9 1.6
Quartile 4 56.3 1.0 24.2 14.0 2.7 1.9
1990-1995
   All Banks 58.4 0.9 21.7 16.5 1.3 1.3
Quartile 1 57.1 1.1 34.7 3.0 1.8 2.4
Quartile 2 53.5 0.3 29.0 16.0 0.4 0.8
Quartile 3 56.4 0.7 30.1 11.1 0.7 1.0
Quartile 4 59.2 1.0 19.1 18.0 1.4 1.4
1996-2000
   All Banks 57.5 1.9 22.6 15.6 1.2 1.2
Quartile 1 20.9 1.6 70.9 2.1 1.0 3.6
Quartile 2 48.4 0.3 32.1 17.8 0.4 1.0
Quartile 3 50.1 1.1 33.9 12.7 0.9 1.4
Quartile 4 60.3 2.2 18.7 16.4 1.4 1.0
Reinforcing our earlier observations, Table 7 shows the importance of claims on the
Latin American countries to the portfolios of both large and small banks. While small banks
have had disproportionately large emphasis on Latin American claims (in 1984 to 1989 at 37
percent, compared with 24 percent for the banks in the largest quartile),  the role of Latin
American investments soared for the smaller banks over the second half of the 1990s.  For
quartile 1 banks, Latin American claims reached over 70 percent of overall foreign exposures16
by the end of the 1990s.  Claims on Industrialized countries have generally been 50 to 60
percent of the foreign exposures of U.S. banks, and remain at these levels for those banks
without a more exclusive Latin American focus.
III.  The Volatility of International Exposures of U.S. Banks
While the previous section has demonstrated that significant differences exist across
banks and over time in the size and composition of U.S. bank foreign claims, it did not
address the reasons for and timing of changes in these claims.  We now turn to this more
dynamic issue, asking whether fluctuations in claims are econometrically explained by
changes in the fundamentals of the countries in which these banks have claims, and by
changes in the fundamentals of the United States.
To examine the fluctuations of bank claims on specific groups of countries, we divide
banks by asset size categories and into the three time intervals (1984-1989, 1990-1995, 1996-
2000). We consider three arbitrary size divisions. First, we define as smaller banks those with
less than $50 million in overall assets (all in real terms).  Medium banks have assets of $50
million to $250 million, and larger banks have assets in excess of $250 million.  Banks are
assigned to these categories for each period in which they are in operation. Thus, if a bank
grows from $100 million in assets in 1987 to $500 million in 1997, that bank will first be
considered a medium-sized entity, and later, after crossing the arbitrary size threshold, will be
a larger bank for the purpose of our specification.
The econometric unraveling of this volatility is easily motivated by basic portfolio
theory. In that spirit, we model a bank’s exposure to a country as dependent on the real rate of
returns on investments in that country c, which are assumed to be functions of local interest
rates, 
c
t i  and on real GDP growth rates, 
c
t GGDP . These foreign country fundamentals are
assessed relative to home market conditions, captured by U.S. real interest rates and U.S. real
GDP growth. Thus, we express the (log) claims of bank i into country c at time t, 
ic
t Exp , as:
10
01 22
ic i i r r c us c us
tt t t t Exp a a t a a t b i c i d GGDP e GGDP =+++ + ⋅ + ⋅+ ⋅ + ⋅     (1)
                                                          
10 We performed a parallel analysis using the share of country c claims in the bank’s portfolio (i.e. claims relative
to bank assets), instead of just examining the changes in the actual bank claims on country c. The few substantive
differences in results are noted later in this section.17
The terms  1
ii aa t +  allow for the possibility that some banks have higher average and trend-
changes in the foreign exposure of their claims, independent of the time-series variables in our
specification. The terms  2
rr aa t +  allow for the possibility that, regardless of observable
fundamentals, some regions are more popular destinations for investment across banks. This
popularity is modeled as having mean and trend components.
In order to avoid estimation problems potentially arising from the unit root properties
of GDP growth, real interest rate, and claim series, we first difference equation (1).  With this
differencing, the bank and region constant terms drop out, and the bank and regional trend
terms enter the resulting first-difference specification in levels.
12
ic i r c us c us
tt t t t Exp a a b i c i d GGDP e GGDP ∆ = + + ⋅∆ + ⋅∆ + ⋅∆ + ⋅∆     (2)
Equation (2) is our basic testing specification, stating that the change in a U.S. bank claims on
any country: has a bank specific component common across all regions (which can represent a
trend toward or against further internationalization of a bank’s overall exposure level); a
region-specific component (which can represent trend change in the popularity of claims of
particular regions); components correlated with changes in foreign country and in U.S. real
interest rates; and components correlated with changes in GDP growth rates for the foreign
country and for the United States.
Using this specification, we pose the following questions to the bank data on country
exposures:
•  Do banks adjust exposure to different regions in similar ways in response to fluctuations
in the macroeconomic fundamentals of those regions? Empirically, this translates into
tests for common b and d across regions.
•  Is U.S. bank exposure to some regions relatively more sensitive to changes in U.S. interest
rates and U.S. output performance? Empirically, this translates into tests for common c
and e across countries.
•  Are smaller banks generally more volatile lenders? Empirically, this would translate into
systematic differences in estimated coefficients b, c, d and e across banks, divided by size.18
To estimate the elasticities of country claims with respect to fundamentals, we gather
country-specific data on real GDP and on real interest rates.  Although our country sample
initially contains 200 countries in which U.S. banks may have claims, we trim the sample in a
number of reasonable dimensions. First, most banks have held positions in a much smaller set
of countries.  Looking across all banks together, on average banks maintain exposures with
respect to 20 to 25 countries. Again, the aggregates mask big differences across larger and
smaller banks (Appendix Table 2).  The larger banks in our sample (in Quartile 4) tend to be
invested in many more countries, with the average across these banks at 86 countries in the
late 1980s, declining to 66 countries in the late 1990s.  Overall, compared with smaller and
mid-sized banks, larger banks have a greater number of countries in which they maintain
relatively smaller foreign exposures.
Moreover, there are some countries in which U.S. banks have little or no exposure. By
deleting these countries we eliminate 51 of the 180 countries for which banks individually
could provide foreign exposure data.
11 Additional countries are dropped from our sample due
to the absence of adequate data on interest rates or GDP.
12 Since there generally is more data
available on GDP than on interest rates by country, we run the regression specification in a
number of ways to generate appropriate insights on GDP and interest rate elasticities, while
maximizing the number of countries and interval of observations explored. We find that the
regression results are robust to the slightly narrower data sample that includes country real
interest rates as well as real GDP growth. Consequently we report only the fully-specified
regressions.
We also want to limit the downward bias on significance that could potentially arise
from keeping in the sample the large number of banks with very small foreign portfolio
shares. The large number of bank-observations with foreign exposure shares well below 1
percent of bank assets indicate that a relatively small number of U.S. banks account for a large
share of the overall bank foreign exposure. We trim the data sample to that used in Table 3A
                                                          
11 Among the 200 initial “country” choices for reporting are about 20 international organizations and regional
aggregates. We delete these “country” observations immediately. For our econometrics, we reduce the sample of
countries examined by eliminating countries where U.S. banks, in aggregate, have less than $10 million of total
exposure. With other data-related exclusions we are left with 105 countries for the regression analysis.
12 We generally use lending rates (IFS 60p), “the lending rate to meet the short and medium term financing needs
of the private sector, differentiated by credit worthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing”. If this rate is
unavailable for a country, we use deposit rates (IFS 60L) or treasury bill rates (IFS 60C). Appendix Table 319
by eliminating from the reported regressions all observations for which bank total foreign
exposure is less than one percent of total bank assets.
Results.  Regressions based on equation (2) demonstrate significant differences in the effects
of fundamentals on bank claims on countries in different regions. In Table 8, we include all
bank observations.  In Table 9 we report the results of regressions that differentiate across
banks on the basis of size. In the reported specifications, the results are unweighted. The
interpretation is that the results describe what -- on average -- influences the claims of
individual banks, irrespective of differences across banks in the relative size of their claims on
countries. The results should not, therefore, be viewed as describing the evolution of total
credit to specific countries or regions.
The first row of Table 8 shows that, across all U.S. banks reporting foreign exposures,
the claims on specific countries are on average relatively insensitive to fluctuations in the real
interest rates of those countries.  Moreover, the GDP growth rates of both industrialized and
emerging market economies do not generally influence the claims on these countries by the
average reporting bank.
13 The lack of significance of own-country GDP growth and own-
country interest rates for U.S. banks claims on emerging markets is a consistent pattern
observed across regression specifications.
More important determinants of U.S. bank claims abroad are the patterns in U.S.
macroeconomic variables.  Industrialized and Latin American country regions are the two
regions in which these U.S. variables often have statistically significant effects. All else equal,
when interest rates rise in the United States, U.S. banks consistently reduce their claims on
other industrialized countries, suggesting the possibility of some substitution across markets.
Likewise, higher U.S. GDP growth is consistently associated with reduced claims on other
industrialized countries.
Higher U.S. GDP growth and interest rates have mixed effects on emerging markets,
with some sensitivity to the regression specifications. For example, higher U.S. interest rates
are associated with higher claims on Latin American countries in the unweighted regressions
                                                                                                                                                                                     
details which countries ultimately are included in our empirical specifications, along with a categorization of
which countries fall under the heading of Europe, Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Other regions.
13 This result also appears in regressions using portfolio shares of country claims (exposure to a country relative
to U.S. bank total assets) as the dependent variable.20
of Table 8. Similar results arise in a claims-weighted version of this regression. For Asia, the
sign of this relationship is negative for the average bank reported in Table 8, but becomes
positive in claims-weighted specifications. The direction of U.S. GDP growth on emerging
market claims is consistent across the unweighted and weighted regression specifications, but
differs across Latin America and Asia. Claims on Latin America expanded for a reporting
U.S. bank when the United States grew faster, but on average claims on Asian countries
contracted.


























































Adjusted R-square: 0.485 Number of Observations: 21700
Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent levels. All
regressions include regional fixed effects and bank fixed effects. Includes only bank observations with
foreign exposure exceeding 1 percent of bank assets.
Next, we consider whether the broad description arising from Table 8 is also pertinent
when we divide banks according to their size, but again compute regressions for the “average
bank”, i.e. unweighted by bank size or total claims.
14  We find that there are in fact observable
differences across smaller and larger banks in the determinants of their claims on foreign
countries.  These differences are apparent through comparisons of Panels A, B, and C of
Table 9.
First for the banks in the smallest asset class category (Panel A), we observe
differences in the role of fundamentals for claims on the (non-U.S.) industrialized countries21
versus those on emerging markets. While increases in industrialized country real interest rates
are associated with larger claims on industrialized countries, claims on emerging markets are
uncorrelated with real local lending rates. Claims on the (non-U.S.) industrialized countries
fall when U.S. interest rates rise, consistent with some substitution between claims on the
United States and other industrialized country borrowers.  For the average small bank, none of
the emerging market macroeconomic fundamentals included in the regressions were
statistically significant and qualitatively important determinants of changes in their claims on
specific emerging markets. These patterns of results were robust to the inclusion of crisis
period dummy variables in the regression specifications.
15
For the larger banks shown in Panel C, we again see the pattern of local country
macroeconomic fundamentals being important mainly in the context of U.S. bank claims on
industrialized countries. Within the emerging market groupings, U.S. bank claims on Latin
American countries expand with the United States grows faster and when U.S. interest rates
rise.
16  For the other emerging markets regions, claims on specific countries are not as tightly
correlated with the macroeconomic fundamentals.
                                                                                                                                                                                     
14 Bank size has been shown to be a relevant consideration in the U.S. lending markets: for example, as Hancock
and Wilcox (1998) show, in response to declines in their own capital small banks shrank their loan portfolios
considerably more than did large banks.
15 We considered 5 distinct crisis dates: Latin American debt crisis: 1984:Q1-1985:Q1; ERM crisis: 1992: Q3-
1993:Q1; Tequila crisis: 1994:Q4-1995:Q1; Asia crisis: 1997:Q3-1997:Q4; Russian default: 1998:Q3-
1998:Q4.We entered these 5 period dummies into the regression specification of equation (2), permitting the
effects to differ across the countries of the six regions in which U.S. banks have positions.
16 For claims on Latin America, there are qualitative differences between these results and those generated using
U.S. bank portfolio allocations.  The alternative approach shows that claims on Latin American countries, when
measured relative to the overall assets of the specific banks, fall --- not rise --- significantly as U.S. GDP growth
and real interest rates increase.22
Table 9  Regression Results, by region and by bank size (unweighted specification)


























































Adjusted R-square: 0.2585 Number of Observations: 10912












































Adjusted R-square: 0.3649 Number of Observations: 4250




















































Adjusted R-square: 0.2028 Number of Observations: 6538
Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent levels. All
regressions include regional fixed effects and bank fixed effects. Includes only bank observations with
foreign exposure exceeding 1 percent of bank assets.23
Finally, we generally observe larger point estimates on the coefficients in the
regression specifications using observations for the larger U.S. banks.  The differences in
these point estimates are statistically significant in the context of claims on Latin American
countries. Especially with respect to positions in emerging market economies, the regressions
suggest that trends in claims may be very significant for the smaller banks, as opposed to
emerging market macroeconomic fundamentals. By contrast, larger bank positions have less
important regional trends and appear to be more responsive to fundamentals.  These patterns
of results are robust to inclusion of crisis period dummy variables.
IV.   Concluding Remarks
Foreign credit to emerging markets is viewed as one means for deepening emerging
capital markets and potentially reducing the severity of crises, when they occur. One relevant
issue is the stability of foreign bank claims on these markets and the source of volatility in
these claims. U.S. banks generally seem to have been steady providers of credit to these
markets in the face of fluctuations in emerging market growth rates and interest rates. Since
lending by banks within emerging markets is likely to be more sensitive to conditions in their
home markets, these results suggest that the U.S. banks may contribute to more stable overall
credit supplies in emerging markets.
On the other hand, the bank claims on emerging markets by large U.S. banks are
sensitive to U.S. cyclical conditions.  The countries end up with a more diversified supply of
credit, but claims on emerging markets could fluctuate with conditions in foreign markets.
The patterns of exposure of small U.S. banks may be driven more by trends, while the
exposures of larger U.S. banks may be driven more by changes in market fundamentals.
There is little evidence of systematic differences in the behavior of U.S. bank claims across
periods associated with international financial crises.24
References
Bomfin, Antulio and William Nelson, “Profits and Balance Sheet Developments at
U.S.Commercial Banks in 1998”, Federal Reserve Bulletin vol. 85 (June 1999) pp. 369-95.
Dages, B. Gerard, Linda Goldberg, and Daniel Kinney. 2000. “Foreign and Domestic Bank
Participation in Emerging Markets: Lessons from Mexico and Argentina”. Economic Policy
Review  vol. 6 no. 3 (September), pp. 17-36.
Goldberg, Linda and Michael Klein. 1998. “Foreign Direct Investment, trade and real
exchange rate linkages in developing countries.” In Managing capital flows and exchange
rates: Lessons from the Pacific Basin. Ed. Reuven Glick, pp73-100. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Hancock, Diana, and James Wilcox. 1998. “The Credit Crunch and the Availability of Credit
to Small Business.” Journal of Banking and Finance 22 (August): 983-1014.
Palmer, David. 2000. “U.S. Bank Exposure to Emerging-Market Countries during Recent
Financial Crises.” Federal Reserve Bulletin, February (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System) pp. 81-96.
Peek, Joe, and Eric Rosengren. 1997. “The International Transmission of Financial Shocks:
The Case of Japan.” American Economic Review 87, no. 4 (September): 495-505.
———. 2000. “Collateral Damage: Effects of the Japanese Bank Crisis on Real Activity in
the United States.” American Economic Review 90, no. 1 (March): 30-45.25
Appendix Table 1   U.S. Bank Conditional Exposures, by Region
(Conditional on activity in a left-handside region, the row entries provide the probability of also







Asia Africa Middle East
84-89 Industrialized
Countries
1.00 0.40 0.94 0.64 0.38 0.38
Developing
Europe
0.98 1.00 0.99 0.86 0.74 0.78
Latin America 0.92 0.39 1.00 0.61 0.37 0.49
Asia 0.99 0.54 0.98 1.00 0.54 0.61
Africa 1.00 0.78 0.99 0.91 1.00 0.73
Middle East 0.97 0.62 0.98 0.78 0.55 1.00
90-95 Industrialized
Countries
1.00 0.25 0.85 0.57 0.27 0.27
Developing
Europe
0.98 1.00 0.98 0.80 0.68 0.83
Latin America 0.86 0.25 1.00 0.53 0.27 0.51
Asia 0.96 0.34 0.89 1.00 0.36 0.58
Africa 0.97 0.61 0.96 0.77 1.00 0.79
Middle East 0.90 0.38 0.91 0.62 0.40 1.00
96-00 Industrialized
Countries
1.00 0.36 0.89 0.62 0.34 0.34
Developing
Europe
0.96 1.00 0.96 0.81 0.63 0.82
Latin America 0.78 0.32 1.00 0.53 0.31 0.52
Asia 0.92 0.45 0.89 1.00 0.46 0.60
Africa 0.95 0.66 0.98 0.86 1.00 0.86
Middle East 0.87 0.50 0.94 0.66 0.49 1.0026
Appendix Table 2 Average Number of Countries in Which Banks Have Foreign
Exposures
1984-1989 1990-1995 1996-2000
All Reporting Banks 27 20 21
Banks Sorted By Quartile*
Quartile 1 14 12 13
Quartile 2 24 14 15
Quartile 3 35 33 35
Quartile 4 86 76 66







Asia and Pacific Africa Middle East
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United
Kingdom
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Repub.
Estonia
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Turkey
Ukraine
Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Trinidad and
Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
Bangladesh
China
Fiji
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
Mongolia
Pakistan
Papua New
Guinea
Philippines
Singapore
South Korea
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Vanuatu
Chad
Congo
Cote d’Ivoire
Equatorial
Guinea
Gabon
Ghana
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Mauritius
Morocco
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
South Africa
Tunisia
Zambia
Bahrain
Egypt
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Oman
Saudi Arabia